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Abstract
This paper is the first in a series whose goal is to develop a fundamentally
new way of constructing theories of physics. The motivation comes from a desire
to address certain deep issues that arise when contemplating quantum theories
of space and time.
Our basic contention is that constructing a theory of physics is equivalent to
finding a representation in a topos of a certain formal language that is attached
to the system. Classical physics arises when the topos is the category of sets.
Other types of theory employ a different topos.
In this paper we discuss two different types of language that can be attached
to a system, S. The first is a propositional language, PL(S); the second is a
higher-order, typed language L(S).
Both languages provide deductive systems with an intuitionistic logic. The
reason for introducing PL(S) is that, as shown in paper II of the series, it is the
easiest way of understanding, and expanding on, the earlier work on topos theory
and quantum physics. However, the main thrust of our programme utilises the
more powerful language L(S) and its representation in an appropriate topos.
1email: a.doering@imperial.ac.uk
2email: c.isham@imperial.ac.uk
1 Introduction
This paper is the first in a series whose goal is to develop a fundamentally new way of
constructing theories of physics. The motivation comes from a desire to address certain
deep issues that arise when contemplating quantum theories of space and time.
A striking feature of the various current programmes for quantising gravity—
including superstring theory and loop quantum gravity—is that, notwithstanding their
disparate views on the nature of space and time, they almost all use more-or-less
standard quantum theory. Although understandable from a pragmatic viewpoint
(since all we have is more-or-less standard quantum theory) this situation is never-
theless questionable when viewed from a wider perspective. Indeed, there has always
been a school of thought asserting that quantum theory itself needs to be radically
changed/developed before it can be used in a fully coherent quantum theory of gravity.
This iconoclastic stance has several roots, of which, for us, the most important is
the use in the standard quantum formalism of certain critical mathematical ingredients
that are taken for granted and yet which, we claim, implicitly assume certain properties
of space and time. Such an a priori imposition of spatio-temporal concepts would be
a major error if they turn out to be fundamentally incompatible with what is needed
for a theory of quantum gravity.
A prime example is the use of the continuum which, in this context, means the real
and/or complex numbers. These are a central ingredient in all the various mathemat-
ical frameworks in which quantum theory is commonly discussed. For example, this is
clearly so with the use of (i) Hilbert spaces and operators; (ii) geometric quantisation;
(iii) probability functions on a non-distributive quantum logic; (iv) deformation quan-
tisation; and (v) formal (i.e., mathematically ill-defined) path integrals and the like.
The a priori imposition of such continuum concepts could be radically incompatible
with a quantum gravity formalism in which, say, space-time is fundamentally discrete:
as, for example, in the causal set programme.
A secondary motivation for changing the quantum formalism is the peristalithic
problem of deciding how a ‘quantum theory of cosmology’ could be interpreted if one
was lucky enough to find one. Most people who worry about foundational issues in
quantum gravity would probably place the quantum cosmology/closed system problem
at, or near, the top of their list of reasons for re-envisioning quantum theory. However,
although we are certainly interested in such conceptual issues, the main motivation for
our research programme is not to find a new interpretation of quantum theory. Rather,
the goal is to find a novel structural framework within which new types of theory can
be constructed, and in which continuum quantities play no fundamental role.
Having said that, it is certainly true that the lack of any external ‘observer’ of the
universe ‘as a whole’ renders inappropriate the standard Copenhagen interpretation
with its instrumentalist use of counterfactual statements about what would happen
if a certain measurement was performed. Indeed, the Copenhagen interpretation is
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inapplicable for any3 system that is truly ‘closed’ (or ‘self-contained’) and for which,
therefore, there is no ‘external’ domain in which an observer can lurk. This problem has
motivated much research over the years and continues to be of wide interest. Clearly,
the problem is particularly severe in a quantum theory of cosmology.
When dealing with a closed system, what is needed is a realist interpretation of
the theory, not one that is instrumentalist. The exact meaning of ‘realist’ is infinitely
debatable but, when used by physicists, it typically means the following:
1. The idea of ‘a property of the system’ (i.e., ‘the value of a physical quantity’) is
meaningful, and representable in the theory.
2. Propositions about the system are handled using Boolean logic. This requirement
is compelling in so far as we humans think in a Boolean way.
3. There is a space of ‘microstates’ such that specifying a microstate4 leads to un-
equivocal truth values for all propositions about the system. The existence of
such a state space is a natural way of ensuring that the first two requirements
are satisfied.
The standard interpretation of classical physics satisfies these requirements, and
provides the paradigmatic example of a realist philosophy in science. On the other
hand, the existence of such an interpretation in quantum theory is foiled by the famous
Kochen-Specker theorem [4].
What is needed is a formalism that is (i) free of prima facie prejudices about the na-
ture of the values of physical quantities—in particular, there should be no fundamental
use of the real or complex numbers; and (ii) ‘realist’, in at least the minimal sense that
propositions are meaningful, and are assigned ‘truth values’, not just instrumentalist
probabilities.
However, finding such a formalism is not easy: it is notoriously difficult to modify
the mathematical framework of quantum theory without destroying the entire edifice.
In particular, the Hilbert space structure is very rigid and cannot easily be changed.
And the formal path-integral techniques do not fare much better.
Our approach includes finding a new way of formulating quantum theory which,
unlike the existing approaches, does admit radical generalisations and changes. A
recent example of such an attempt is the work of Abramsky and Coecke who construct
a categorical analogue of some of the critical parts of the Hilbert space formalism [5];
see also the work by Vicary [6]. Here, we adopt a different strategy based on the
intrinsic logical structure that is associated with any topos.5
3Of course, the existence of the long-range, and all penetrating, gravitational force means that, at
a fundamental level, there is really only one truly closed system, and that is the universe itself.
4In simple non-relativistic systems, the state is specified at any given moment of time. Relativistic
systems (particularly quantum gravity!) require a more sophisticated understanding of ‘state’, but
the general idea is the same.
5Topos theory is a sophisticated subject and, for theoretical physicists, not always that easy to
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Our contention is that theories of a physical system should be formulated in a topos
that depends on both the theory-type and the system. More precisely, if a theory-
type (such as classical physics, or quantum physics) is applicable to a certain class of
systems, then, for each system in this class, there is a topos in which the theory is to
be formulated. For some theory-types the topos is system-independent: for example,
conventional classical physics always uses the topos of sets. For other theory-types, the
topos varies from system to system: for example, this is the case in quantum theory.
In regard to the three conditions listed above for a ‘realist’ interpretation, our
scheme has the following ingredients:
1. The concept of the ‘value of a physical quantity’ is meaningful, although this
‘value’ is associated with an object in the topos that may not be the real-number
object. With that caveat, the concept of a ‘property of the system’ is also mean-
ingful.
2. Propositions about a system are representable by a Heyting algebra associated
with the topos. A Heyting algebra is a distributive lattice that differs from a
Boolean algebra only in so far as the law of excluded middle need not hold,
i.e., α ∨ ¬α  1. A Boolean algebra is a Heyting algebra with strict equality:
α ∨ ¬α = 1.
3. There is a ‘state object’ in the topos. However, generally speaking, there will
not be enough ‘microstates’ to determine this. Nevertheless, truth values can be
assigned to propositions with the aid of a ‘truth object’. These truth values lie
in another Heyting algebra.
This new approach affords a way in which it becomes feasible to generalise quantum
theory without any fundamental reference to Hilbert spaces, path integrals, etc.; in
particular, there is no prima facie reason for introducing continuum quantities. As we
have emphasised, this is our main motivation for developing the topos approach. We
shall say more about this later.
From a conceptual perspective, a central feature of our scheme is the ‘neo-realist6’
structure reflected in the three statements above. This neo-realism is the conceptual
fruit of the mathematical fact that a physical theory expressed in a topos ‘looks’ very
much like classical physics.
This fundamental feature stems from (and, indeed, is defined by) the existence of
two special objects in the topos: the ‘state object’7, Σφ, mentioned above, and the
‘quantity-value object’, Rφ. Then: (i) any physical quantity, A, is represented by
an arrow Aφ : Σφ → Rφ in the topos; and (ii) propositions about the system are
understand. The references that we have found most helpful in this series of papers are [7, 8, 10, 9,
11, 12]. Some of the basic ideas are described briefly in the Appendix to this paper.
6We coin the term ‘neo-realist’ to signify the conceptual structure implied by our topos formulation
of theories of physics.
7The meaning of the subscript ‘φ’ is explained in the main text. It refers to a particular topos-
representation of a formal language attached to the system: see later.
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represented by sub-objects of the state object Σφ. These form a Heyting algebra, as is
the case for the set of sub-objects of any object in a topos.
The fact that physical quantities are represented by arrows whose domain is the
object Σφ, and propositions are represented by sub-objects of Σφ, suggests strongly
that Σφ should be regarded as the topos-analogue of a classical state space. Indeed,
for any classical system the topos is just the category of sets, Sets, and then the ideas
above reduce to the familiar picture in which (i) there is a state space S which is a
set; (ii) any physical quantity, A, is represented by a real-valued functions A˘ : S → IR;
and (iii) propositions are represented by subsets of S, and with the associated Boolean
algebra.
The present work is the first of a series of papers devoted to exploring in depth
the idea that theories of physics should be expressed in a topos that depends on both
the theory-type and the system; and that physical quantities and propositions are
represented in the ways indicated above. Papers II and III in the series are concerned
with quantum theory [1, 2] which serves as a paradigmatic example for the general
theory. These ideas are motivated by earlier work by one of us (CJI) and Butterfield
on interpreting quantum theory in a topos [21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 25]; see also [20, 27].
In the present paper, we will make precise the sense in which propositions about
a system can be represented by sub-objects of an object in a topos. To this end, we
introduce a formal language for each system with the key idea that the construction of
a theory of the system involves finding a representation of the associated language in
an appropriate topos. These languages are deductive systems employing intuitionistic
logic; as such, they can be used to make, and manipulate, statements about the world
as it is revealed in the system under study.
In paper IV ([3]) we return once more to the overall formalism and consider what
happens to the languages and their representations when the system ranges over the
objects in a ‘category of systems’. This category incorporates the ideas of forming
composites of systems, and finding sub-systems of a system.
The plan of the present paper is as follows. Section 2 is written in a rather discursive
style and deals with various topics with a significant conceptual content. In particu-
lar, we discuss in more detail some of the issues concerning the status of continuum
quantities in physics.
Then, in Section 3 we introduce a simple propositional language, PL(S), that
can be used to assert statements about the world as it is reflected in the system
S. The propositional logic used in this language is intuitionistic and, therefore, it is
mathematically consistent to seek representations of PL(S) in a Heyting algebra; in
particular in the collection of sub-objects of the state object of a topos.
Simple propositional languages are limited in scope and, therefore, in Section 4 a
higher-order, typed language, L(S), is developed. Languages of this sort lie at the
heart of topos theory and are of great power. We discuss in detail an example of such a
language which, although simple, can be used for many physical systems. This language
has just two ‘ground type’ symbols, Σ and R, that are the linguistic precursors of the
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state object, and quantity-value object, respectively. In addition, there are ‘function
symbols’ A : Σ → R that represent physical quantities in the theory. We show how
representations of L(S) in a topos correspond to concrete physical theories, and work
out the scheme in detail for classical physics. (The application to quantum theory is
discussed in the next two papers [1, 2].) Finally, in Section 5 we draw some conclusions
about this first chapter of our endeavour to construct a topos framework within which
to construct theories of physics.
The paper concludes with an Appendix which contains some of the central ideas of
topos theory. Many important topics are left out for reasons of space, but we have tried
to include the key ideas used in this series of papers. To gain a proper understanding
of topos theory, we recommend the standard text books [7, 8, 10, 9, 11, 12]
2 The Conceptual Background of our Scheme
2.1 The Problem of Using Real Numbers a Priori
As mentioned in the Introduction, one of the main goals of our work is to find new
tools with which to develop theories that are significant extensions of, or developments
from, quantum theory but without being tied a priori to the use of the real or complex
numbers.
In this context we note that real numbers arise in theories of physics in three
different (but related) ways: (i) as the values of physical quantities; (ii) as the values
of probabilities; and (iii) as a fundamental ingredient in models of space and time
(especially in those based on differential geometry). The first two are of direct concern
in our worries about making unjustified, a priori assumptions in quantum theory, and
we shall now examine them in detail.
Why are physical quantities assumed to be real-valued? One reason for as-
suming physical quantities to be real-valued is undoubtedly that, traditionally (i.e., in
the pre-digital age), they are measured with rulers and pointers (or they are defined
operationally in terms of such measurements), and rulers and pointers are taken to be
classical objects that exist in the continuum physical space of classical physics. In this
sense there is a direct link between the space in which physical quantities take their
values (what we shall call the ‘quantity-value space’) and the nature of physical space
or space-time [19].
If conceded, this claim means that the assumption that physical quantities are
real-valued is problematic in a theory in which space, or space-time, is not modelled
by a smooth manifold. Admittedly, if the theory employs a background space, or
space-time—and if this background is a manifold—then the use of real-valued physical
quantities is justified in so far as their value-space can be related to this background.
Such a stance is particularly appropriate in situations where the background plays a
central role in giving meaning to concepts like ‘observers’ and ‘measuring devices’, and
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thereby provides a basis for an instrumentalist interpretation of the theory.
However, caution is needed with this argument since the background structure
may arise only in some ‘sector’ of the theory; or it may exist only in some limiting,
or approximate, sense. The associated instrumentalist interpretation would then be
similarly limited in scope. For this reason, if no other, a ‘realist’ interpretation is more
attractive than an instrumentalist one.
In fact, in such circumstances, the phrase ‘realist interpretation’ does not really do
justice to the situation since it tends to imply that there are other interpretations of
the theory, particularly instrumentalism, with which the realist one can contend on a
more-or-less equal footing. But, as we just argued, the instrumentalist interpretation
may be severely limited in scope as compared to the realist one. To flag this point, we
will sometimes refer to a ‘realist formalism’, rather than a ‘realist interpretation’.8
Why are probabilities required to lie in the interval [0, 1]? The motivation for
using the subset [0, 1] of the real numbers as the value space for probabilities comes from
the relative-frequency interpretation of probability. Thus, in principle, an experiment
is to be repeated a large number, N , times, and the probability associated with a
particular result is defined to be the ratio Ni/N , where Ni is the number of experiments
in which that result was obtained. The rational numbers Ni/N necessarily lie between
0 and 1, and if the limit N →∞ is taken—as is appropriate for a hypothetical ‘infinite
ensemble’—real numbers in the closed interval [0, 1] are obtained.
The relative-frequency interpretation of probability is natural in instrumentalist
theories of physics, but it is not meaningful if there is no classical spatio-temporal
background in which the necessary measurements could be made; or, if there is a
background, it is one to which the relative-frequency interpretation cannot be adapted.
In the absence of a relativity-frequency interpretation, the concept of ‘probability’
must be understood in a different way. In the physical sciences, one of the most dis-
cussed approaches involves the concept of ‘potentiality’, or ‘latency’, as favoured by
Heisenberg, Margenau, and Popper [15][16][17] (and, for good measure, Aristotle). In
this case there is no compelling reason why the probability-value space should be a sub-
set of the real numbers. The minimal requirement is that this value-space is an ordered
set—so that one proposition can be said to be more or less probable than another. How-
ever, there is no prima facie reason why this set should be totally ordered: i.e., there
may be pairs of propositions whose potentialities cannot be compared—something that
seems eminently plausible in the context of non-commensurable quantities in quantum
theory.
8Of course, such discussions are unnecessary in classical physics since, there, if knowledge of the
value of a physical quantity is gained by making a (ideal) measurement, the reason why we obtain the
result that we do, is because the quantity possessed that value immediately before the measurement
was made. In other words, “epistemology models ontology”—a slogan employed with great enthusiasm
by John Polkinghorne in his advocacy of the philosophy of ‘critical realism’ as a crucial tool with which
to analyse epistemological parallels between science and religion. Supposedly, the phrase is printed
on his T-shirts:-)
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By invoking the idea of ‘potentiality’, it becomes feasible to imagine a quantum-
gravity theory with no spatio-temporal background but where probability is still a
fundamental concept. However, it could also be that the concept of probability plays no
fundamental role in such circumstances, and can be given a meaning only in the context
of a sector, or limit, of the theory where a background does exist. This background
could then support a limited instrumentalist interpretation which would include a
(limited) relative-frequency understanding of probability.
In fact, most modern approaches to quantum gravity aspire to a formalism that is
background independent [28, 29, 30, 31]. So, if a background space does arise, it will
be in one of the restricted senses mentioned above. Indeed, it is often asserted that a
proper theory of quantum gravity will not involve any direct spatio-temporal concepts,
and that what we commonly call ‘space’ and ‘time’ will ‘emerge’ from the formalism
only in some appropriate limit [18]. In this case, any instrumentalist interpretation
could only ‘emerge’ in the same limit, as would the associated relative-frequency inter-
pretation of probability.
In a theory of this type, there will be no prima facie link between the values of
physical quantities and the nature of space or space-time although, of course, this
cannot be totally ruled out. In any event, part of the fundamental specification of the
theory will involve deciding what the ‘quantity-value space’ should be.
These considerations suggest that quantum theory must be radically changed in
order to accommodate situations where there is no background space, or space-time,
manifold within which an instrumentalist interpretation can be formulated, and where,
therefore, some sort of ‘realist’ formalism is essential.
These reflections also suggest that the quantity-value space employed in an instru-
mentalist realisation of a theory—or a ‘sector’, or ‘limit’, of the theory—need not be
the same as the quantity-value space in a neo-realist formulation. At first sight this
may seem strange but, as is shown in the third paper of this series, this is precisely
what happens in the topos reformulation of standard quantum theory [2].
2.2 The Genesis of Topos Ideas in Physics
2.2.1 A Possible Role for Heyting Algebras
To motivate topos theory as the source of neo-realism let us first consider classical
physics, where everything is defined in the category, Sets, of sets and functions between
sets. Then (i) any physical quantity, A, is represented by a real-valued function A˘ :
S → IR, where S is the space of microstates; and (ii) a proposition of the form “Aε∆”
(which asserts that the value of the physical quantity A lies in the subset ∆ of the real
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line IR)9 is represented by the subset10 A˘−1(∆) ⊆ S. In fact any proposition P about
the system is represented by an associated subset, SP , of S: namely, the set of states
for which P is true. Conversely, every subset of S represents a proposition.11
It is easy to see how the logical calculus of propositions arises in this picture. For
let P and Q be propositions, represented by the subsets SP and SQ respectively, and
consider the proposition “P and Q”. This is true if, and only if, both P and Q are
true, and hence the subset of states that represents this logical conjunction consists of
those states that lie in both SP and SQ—i.e., the set-theoretic intersection SP ∩ SQ.
Thus “P and Q” is represented by SP ∩SQ. Similarly, the proposition “P or Q” is true
if either P or Q (or both) are true, and hence this logical disjunction is represented by
those states that lie in SP plus those states that lie in SQ—i.e., the set-theoretic union
SP ∪ SQ. Finally, the logical negation “not P” is represented by all those points in S
that do not lie in SP—i.e., the set-theoretic complement S/SP .
In this way, a fundamental relation is established between the logical calculus of
propositions about a physical system, and the Boolean algebra of subsets of the state
space. Thus the mathematical structure of classical physics is such that, of necessity,
it reflects a ‘realist’ philosophy, in the sense in which we are using the word.
One way to escape from the tyranny of Boolean algebras and classical realism is
via topos theory. Broadly speaking, a topos is a category that behaves very much like
the category of sets (see Appendix); in particular, the collection of sub-objects of an
object forms a Heyting algebra, just as the collection of subsets of a set form a Boolean
algebra. Our intention, therefore, is to explore the possibility of associating physical
propositions with sub-objects of some object Σ (the analogue of a classical state space)
in some topos.
A Heyting algebra, h, is a distributive lattice with a zero element, 0, and a unit
element, 1, and with the property that to each pair α, β ∈ h there is an implication
α⇒ β, characterized by
γ  (α⇒ β) if and only if γ ∧ α  β. (2.1)
The negation is defined as ¬α := (α ⇒ 0) and has the property that the law of
excluded middle need not hold, i.e., there may exist α ∈ h, such that α ∨ ¬α ≺ 1 or,
equivalently, ¬¬α ≻ α. This is the characteristic property of an intuitionistic logic.
A Boolean algebra is the special case of a Heyting algebra in which there is the strict
equality α ∨ ¬α = 1.
9In the rigorous theory of classical physics, the set S is a symplectic manifold, and ∆ is a Borel
subset of IR. Also, the function A˘ : S → IR may be required to be measurable, or continuous, or
smooth, depending on the quantity, A, under consideration.
10Throughout this series of papers we will adopt the notation in which A ⊆ B means that A is a
subset of B that could equal B; while A ⊂ B means that A is a proper subset of B; i.e., A does not
equal B. Similar remarks apply to other pairs of ordering symbols like ≺,; or ≻,, etc.
11More precisely, every Borel subset of S represents many propositions about the values of physical
quantities. Two propositions are said to be ‘physically equivalent’ if they are represented by the same
subset of S.
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The elements of a Heyting algebra can be manipulated in a very similar way to
those in a Boolean algebra. One of our claims is that, as far as theories of physics are
concerned, Heyting logic is a viable12 alternative to Boolean logic.
To give some idea of the difference between a Boolean algebra and a Heyting algebra,
we note that the paradigmatic example of the former is the collection of all measurable
subsets of a measure space X. Here, if α ⊆ X represents a proposition, the logical
negation, ¬α, is just the set-theoretic complement X/α.
On the other hand, the paradigmatic example of a Heyting algebra is the collection
of all open sets in a topological space X. Here, if α ⊆ X is open, the logical negation
¬α is defined to be the interior of the set-theoretical complement X/α. Therefore,
the difference between ¬α in the topological space X, and ¬α in the measurable space
generated by the topology of X, is just the ‘thin’ boundary of X/α.
2.2.2 Our Main Contention about Topos Theory and Physics
We contend that, for a given theory-type (for example, classical physics, or quantum
physics), each system S to which the theory is applicable is associated with a particular
topos τφ(S) within whose framework the theory, as applied to S, is to be formulated
and interpreted. In this context, the ‘φ’-subscript is a label that changes as the theory-
type changes. It signifies the representation of a system-language in the topos τφ(S):
we will come to this later.
The conceptual interpretation of this formalism is ‘neo-realist’ in the following sense:
1. A physical quantity, A, is represented by an arrow Aφ,S : Σφ,S → Rφ,S where Σφ,S
and Rφ,S are two special objects in the topos τφ(S). These are the analogues of,
respectively, (i) the classical state space, S; and (ii) the real numbers, IR, in
which classical physical quantities take their values.
In what follows, Σφ,S and Rφ,S are called the ‘state object’, and the ‘quantity-
value object’, respectively.
2. Propositions about the system S are represented by sub-objects of Σφ,S. These
sub-objects form a Heyting algebra.
3. Once the topos analogue of a state (a ‘truth object’) has been specified, these
propositions are assigned truth values in the Heyting logic associated with the
global elements of the sub-object classifier, Ωτφ(S), in the topos τφ(S).
Thus a theory expressed in this way looks very much like classical physics ex-
cept that whereas classical physics always employs the topos of sets, other theories—
including quantum theory and, we conjecture, quantum gravity—use a different topos.
12The main difference between theorems proved using Heyting logic and those using Boolean logic is
that proofs by contradiction cannot be used in the former. In particular, this means that one cannot
prove that something exists by arguing that the assumption that it does not leads to contradiction; in-
stead it is necessary to provide a constructive proof of the existence of the entity concerned. Arguably,
this does not place any major restriction on building theories of physics.
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One deep result in topos theory is that there is an internal language associated
with each topos. In fact, not only does each topos generate an internal language,
but, conversely, a language satisfying appropriate conditions generates a topos. Topoi
constructed in this way are called ‘linguistic topoi’, and every topos can be regarded as a
linguistic topos. In many respects, this is one of the profoundest ways of understanding
what a topos really ‘is’. This aspect of topos theory is discussed at length in the books
by Bell [9], and Lambek and Scott [10].
These results are exploited in Section 4 where we introduce the idea that, for any
applicable theory-type, each physical system S is associated with a ‘local’ language,
L(S). The application of the theory-type to S is then equivalent to finding a represen-
tation of L(S) in a topos.
Closely related to the existence of this linguistic structure is the striking fact that
a topos can be used as a foundation for mathematics itself, just as set theory is used
in the foundations of ‘normal’ (or ‘classical’) mathematics. In this context, the key
remark is that the internal language of a topos has a form that is similar in many ways
to the formal language on which normal set theory is based. It is this internal, topos
language that is used to interpret the theory in a ‘neo-realist’ way.
The main difference with classical logic is that the logic of the topos language does
not satisfy the principle of excluded middle, and hence proofs by contradiction are not
permitted. This has many intriguing consequences. For example, there are topoi with
genuine infinitesimals that can be used to construct a rival to normal calculus. The
possibility of such quantities stems from the fact that the normal proof that they do
not exist is a proof by contradiction.
Thus each topos carries its own world of mathematics: a world which, generally
speaking, is not the same as that of classical mathematics.
Consequently, by postulating that, for a given theory-type, each physical system
carries its own topos, we are also saying that to each physical system plus theory-
type there is associated a framework for mathematics itself! Thus classical physics
uses classical mathematics; and quantum theory uses ‘quantum mathematics’—the
mathematics formulated in the topoi of quantum theory. To this we might add the
conjecture: “Quantum gravity uses ‘quantum gravity’ mathematics”!
3 Propositional Languages and Theories of Physics
3.1 Two Opposing Interpretations of Propositions
Attempts to construct a na¨ıve realist interpretation of quantum theory founder on the
Kochen-Specker theorem. However, if, despite this theorem, some degree of realism is
still sought, there are not that many options.
One approach is to ‘reify’ only a subset of physical variables, as, for example, in the
pilot-wave approach and other ‘modal interpretations’. A topos-theoretic extension of
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this idea of ‘partial reification’ was proposed in [21, 22, 23, 24] with a technique in
which all possible reifyable sets of physical variables are included on an equal footing.
This involves constructing a category, C, whose objects are collections of quantum
observables that can be simultaneously reified because the corresponding self-adjoint
operators commute. Of course, the concept of ‘measurement’ plays no fundamental
role in our neo-realist, topos approach.
In this earlier work, it was postulated that the logic for handling quantum proposi-
tions from this perspective is that associated with the topos of presheaves13, SetsC
op
.
The idea is that a single presheaf will encode any quantum proposition from the per-
spective of all contexts at once. However, in the original papers, the crucial ‘daseinisa-
tion’ operation (see paper II) was not known and, consequently, the discussion became
convoluted in places. In addition, the generality and power of the underlying procedure
was not fully appreciated.
For this reason, in the present paper we return to the basic questions and reconsider
them in the light of the overall topos structure that has now become clear.
We start by considering the way in which propositions arise, and are manipulated,
in physics. For simplicity, we will concentrate on systems that are associated with
‘standard’ physics. Then, to each such system S there is associated a set of physical
quantities—such as energy, momentum, position, angular momentum etc.14—all of
which are real-valued. The associated propositions are of the form “Aε∆”, where A
is a physical quantity, and ∆ is a subset15 of IR.
From a conceptual perspective, the proposition “Aε∆” can be read in two, very
different, ways:
(i) The (na¨ıve) realist interpretation: “The physical quantity A has a value,
and that value lies in ∆.”
(ii) The instrumentalist interpretation: “If a measurement is made of A, the
result will be found to lie in ∆.”
The former is the familiar, ‘commonsense’ understanding of propositions in both clas-
sical physics and daily life. The latter underpins the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum theory. The instrumentalist interpretation can, of course, be applied to clas-
sical physics too, but it does not lead to anything new. For, in classical physics, what
is measured is what is the case: “Epistemology models ontology”.
We will now study the role of propositions in physics more carefully, particularly
in the context of ‘realist’ interpretations.
13The idea of a presheaf is discussed briefly in the Appendix. From a physical perspective, the
objects in the category C are contexts in which the structure of the theory can be discussed. In
quantum theory, the category C is just a partially-ordered set, which simplifies many manipulations.
14This set does not have to contain ‘all ’ possible physical quantities: it suffices to concentrate on
a subset that are deemed to be of particular interest. However, at some point, questions may arise
about the ‘completeness’ of the set.
15For various reasons, the subset ∆ ⊆ IR is usually required to be a Borel subset, and we will assume
this without further comment.
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3.2 The Propositional Language PL(S)
3.2.1 Intuitionistic Logic and the Definition of PL(S)
We are going to construct a formal language, PL(S), with which to express propositions
about a physical system, S, and to make deductions concerning them. Our intention
is to interpret these propositions in a ‘realist’ way: an endeavour whose mathematical
underpinning lies in constructing a representation of PL(S) in a Heyting algebra, H,
that is part of the mathematical framework involved in the application of a particular
theory-type to S.
The first step is to construct the set, PL(S)0, of all strings of the form “Aε∆”
where A is a physical quantity of the system S, and ∆ is a (Borel) subset of the real
line, IR. Note that what has here been called a ‘physical quantity’ could better (but
more clumsily) be termed the ‘name’ of the physical quantity. For example, when we
talk about the ‘energy’ of a system, the word ‘energy’ is the same, and functions in the
same way in the formal language, irrespective of the details of the actual Hamiltonian
of the system.
The strings “Aε∆” are taken to be the primitive propositions about the system,
and are used to define ‘sentences’. More precisely, a new set of symbols {¬,∧,∨,⇒}
is added to the language, and then a sentence is defined inductively by the following
rules (see Ch. 6 in [8]):
1. Each primitive proposition “Aε∆” in PL(S)0 is a sentence.
2. If α is a sentence, then so is ¬α.
3. If α and β are sentences, then so are α ∧ β, α ∨ β, and α⇒ β.
The collection of all sentences, PL(S), is an elementary formal language that can
be used to express and manipulate propositions about the system S. Note that the
symbols ¬, ∧, ∨, and ⇒ have no explicit meaning, although of course the implicit
intention is that they should stand for ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘implies’, respectively. This
implicit meaning becomes explicit when a representation of PL(S) is constructed as
part of the application of a theory-type to S (see below). Note also that PL(S) is a
propositional language only: it does not contain the quantifiers ‘∀’ or ‘∃’. To include
them requires a higher-order language. We shall return to this in our discussion of the
local language L(S).
The next step arises because PL(S) is not only a vehicle for expressing propositions
about the system S: we also want to reason with it about the system. To achieve this,
a series of axioms for a deductive logic must be added to PL(S). This could be either
classical logic or intuitionistic logic, but we select the latter since it allows a larger
class of representations/models, including representations in topoi in which the law of
excluded middle fails.
The axioms for intuitionistic logic consist of a finite collection of sentences in PL(S)
12
(for example, α ∧ β ⇒ β ∧ α), plus a single rule of inference, modus ponens (the ‘rule
of detachment’) which says that from α and α⇒ β the sentence β may be derived.
Others axioms might be added to PL(S) to reflect the implicit meaning of the
primitive proposition “Aε∆”: i.e., “A has a value, and that value lies in ∆ ⊆ IR”. For
example, the sentence “Aε∆1 ∧ Aε∆2” (‘A belongs to ∆1’ and ‘A belongs to ∆2’)
might seem to be equivalent to “Aε∆1 ∩ ∆2” (‘A belongs to ∆1 ∩ ∆2’). A similar
remark applies to “Aε∆1 ∨Aε∆2”.
Thus, along with the axioms of intuitionistic logic and detachment, we might be
tempted to add the following axioms:
Aε∆1 ∧Aε∆2 ⇔ Aε∆1 ∩∆2 (3.1)
Aε∆1 ∨Aε∆2 ⇔ Aε∆1 ∪∆2 (3.2)
These axioms are consistent with the intuitionistic logical structure of PL(S).
We shall see later the extent to which the axioms (3.1–3.2) are compatible with
the topos representations of classical physics, and of quantum physics. However, the
other obvious proposition to consider in this way—“It is not the case that A belongs
to ∆”—is clearly problematical.
In classical logic, this proposition16, “¬(Aε∆)”, is equivalent to “A belongs to
IR\∆”, where IR\∆ denotes the set-theoretic complement of ∆ in IR. This suggests
augmenting (3.1–3.2) with a third axiom
¬(Aε∆)⇔ Aε IR\∆ (3.3)
However, applying ‘¬’ to both sides of (3.3) gives
¬¬(Aε∆)⇔ Aε IR (3.4)
because of the set-theoretic result IR\(IR\∆) = ∆. But in an intuitionistic logic we do
not have α⇔ ¬¬α but only α⇒ ¬¬α, and so (3.3) could be false in a Heyting-algebra
representation of PL(S) that was not Boolean. Therefore, adding (3.3) as an axiom in
PL(S) is not indicated if representations are to be sought in non-Boolean topoi.
3.2.2 Representations of PL(S).
To use the language PL(S) ‘for real’ it must be represented in the concrete mathemat-
ical structure that arises when a theory-type is applied to S. Such a representation,
pi, maps each of the primitive propositions, α, in PL(S)0 to an element, pi(α), of some
Heyting algebra (which could be Boolean), H, whose specification is, of course, part
of the theory. For example, in classical mechanics, the propositions are represented in
the Boolean algebra of all (Borel) subsets of the classical state space.
16The parentheses ( ) are not symbols in the language; they are just a way of grouping letters and
sentences.
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The representation of the primitive propositions can be extended recursively to all
of PL(S) with the aid of the following rules [8]:
(a) pi(α ∨ β) := pi(α) ∨ pi(β) (3.5)
(b) pi(α ∧ β) := pi(α) ∧ pi(β) (3.6)
(c) pi(¬α) := ¬pi(α) (3.7)
(d) pi(α⇒ β) := pi(α)⇒ pi(β) (3.8)
Note that, on the left hand side of (3.5–3.8), the symbols {¬,∧,∨,⇒} are elements of
the language PL(S), whereas on the right hand side they are the logical connectives
in the Heyting algebra, H, in which the representation takes place.
This extension of pi from PL(S)0 to PL(S) is consistent with the axioms for the
intuitionistic, propositional logic of the language PL(S). More precisely, these axioms
become tautologies: i.e., they are all represented by the maximum element, 1, in the
Heyting algebra. By construction, the map pi : PL(S) → H is then a representation
of PL(S) in the Heyting algebra H. A logician would say that pi : PL(S) → H is an
H-valuation, or H-model, of the language PL(S).
Note that different systems, S, can have the same language. For example, consider a
point-particle moving in one dimension, with a Hamiltonian H = p
2
2m
+V (x). Different
potentials V (x) correspond to different systems (in the sense in which we are using
the word ‘system’), but the physical quantities for these systems—or, more precisely,
the ‘names’ of these quantities, for example, ‘energy’, ‘position’, ‘momentum’—are
the same for them all. Consequently, the language PL(S) is independent of V (x).
However, the representation of, say, the proposition “Hε∆”, with a specific subset of
the state space will depend on the details of the Hamiltonian.
Clearly, a major consideration in using the language PL(S) is choosing the Heyting
algebra in which the representation takes place. A fundamental result in topos theory
is that the set of all sub-objects of any object in a topos is a Heyting algebra: these
are the Heyting algebras with which we will be concerned.
Of course, beyond the language, S, and its representation pi, lies the question of
whether or not a proposition is true. This requires the concept of a ‘state’ which,
when specified, yields ‘truth values’ for the primitive propositions in PL(S). These
are then extended recursively to the rest of PL(S). In classical physics, the possible
truth values are just ‘true’ or ‘false’. However, the situation in topos theory is more
complex, and discussion is deferred to paper II of the present series [1].
Introducing time dependence. There is also the question of ‘how things change
in time’. In the form presented above, the language PL(S) may seem geared towards
a ‘canonical’ perspective in so far as the propositions concerned are, presumably, to be
asserted at a particular moment of time, and, as such, deal with the values of physical
quantities at that time. In other words, the underlying spatio-temporal perspective
seems thoroughly ‘Newtonian’. This is partly true; but only partly, since the phrase
‘physical quantity’ can have meanings other than the canonical one. For example, one
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could talk about the ‘time average of momentum’, and call that a physical quantity.
In this case, the propositions would be about histories of the system, not just ‘the way
things are’ at a particular moment in time.
We will return to these extended versions of the formalism in our discussion of the
higher-order language, L(S), in Section 4.4. However, for the moment let us focus on
the canonical perspective, and the associated question of how time dependence is to
be incorporated. This can be addressed in various ways.
One possibility is to attach a time label, t, to the physical quantities, so that the
primitive propositions become of the form “At ε∆”. In this case, the language itself
becomes time-dependent, so that we should write PL(S)t. One might not like the idea
of adding external labels in the language and, indeed, in our discussion of the higher-
order language L(S) we will strive to eliminate such things. However, in the present
case, in so far as ∆ ⊆ IR is already an ‘external’ (to the language) entity, there seems
no particular objection to adding another one.
If we adopt this approach, the representation pi will map “At ε∆” to a time-
dependent element, pi(At ε∆), of the Heyting algebra, H; one could say that this is
a type of ‘Heisenberg picture’. However, this suggests another option, which is to keep
the language time-independent, but allow the representation to be time-dependent. In
that case, pit(Aε∆) will again be a time-dependent member of H.
Another approach is to let the ‘truth object’ in the theory be time-dependent: this
corresponds to a type of Schro¨dinger picture. We will return to this subject in paper
II where the concept of a truth object is discussed in detail [1].
3.2.3 The Representation of PL(S) in Classical Physics
Let us now look at the representation of PL(S) that corresponds to classical physics.
In this case, the topos involved is just the category, Sets, of sets and functions between
sets.
We will denote by picl the representation of PL(S) that describes the classical,
Hamiltonian mechanics of a system, S, whose state-space is a symplectic (or Poisson)
manifold S. We denote by A˘ : S → IR the real-valued function17 on S that represents
the physical quantity A.
Then the representation picl maps the primitive proposition “Aε∆” to the subset
of S given by
picl(Aε∆) := {s ∈ S | A˘(s) ∈ ∆}
= A˘−1(∆). (3.9)
This representation can be extended to all the sentences in PL(S) with the aid of
17In practice, A˘ is required to be measurable, or smooth, depending on the type of physical quantity
that A is. However, for the most part, these details of classical mechanics are not relevant to our dis-
cussions, and usually we will not characterise A˘ : S → IR beyond just saying that it is a function/map
from S to IR.
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(3.5–3.8). Note that, since ∆ is a Borel subset of IR, A˘−1(∆) is a Borel subset of the
state-space S. Hence, in this case, H is equal to the Boolean algebra of all Borel subsets
of S.
We note that, for all (Borel) subsets ∆1,∆2 of IR we have
A˘−1(∆1) ∩ A˘
−1(∆2) = A˘
−1(∆1 ∩∆2) (3.10)
A˘−1(∆1) ∪ A˘
−1(∆2) = A˘
−1(∆1 ∪∆2) (3.11)
¬A˘−1(∆1) = A˘
−1(IR\∆1) (3.12)
and hence all three conditions (3.1–3.3) that we discussed earlier can be added consis-
tently to the language PL(S) .
Consider now the assignment of truth values to the propositions in this theory.
This involves the idea of a ‘state’ which, in classical physics, is simply an element s of
the state space S. Each state s assigns to each primitive proposition “Aε∆”, a truth
value, ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
, which lies in the set {false, true} (which we identify with {0, 1}) and
is defined as
ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
:=
{
1 if A˘(s) ∈ ∆;
0 otherwise
(3.13)
for all s ∈ S.
3.2.4 The Failure to Represent PL(S) in Standard Quantum Theory.
The procedure above that works so easily for classical physics fails completely if one
tries to apply it to standard quantum theory.
In quantum physics, a physical quantity A is represented by a self-adjoint operator
Aˆ on a Hilbert space H, and the proposition “Aε∆” is represented by the projection
operator Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] which projects onto the subset ∆ of the spectrum of Aˆ; i.e.,
pi(Aε∆) := Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]. (3.14)
Of course, the set of all projection operators, P(H), inH has a ‘logic’ of its own—the
‘quantum logic’18 of the Hilbert space H—but this is incompatible with the intuition-
istic logic of the language PL(S), and the representation (3.14).
Indeed, since the ‘logic’ P(H) is non-distributive, there will exist non-commuting
operators Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, and Borel subsets ∆A,∆B,∆C of IR such that
19
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆A] ∧
(
Eˆ[B ∈ ∆B] ∨ Eˆ[C ∈ ∆C ]
)
6= (3.15)(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆A] ∧ Eˆ[B ∈ ∆B]
)
∨
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆A] ∧ Eˆ[C ∈ ∆C ]
)
(3.16)
18For an excellent survey of quantum logic see [14]. This includes a discussion of a first-order
axiomatisation of quantum logic, and with an associated sequent calculus. It is interesting to compare
our work with what the authors of this paper have done. We hope to return to this at some time in
the future.
19There is a well-known example that uses three rays in IR2, so this phenomenon is not particularly
exotic.
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while, on the other hand, the logical bi-implication
α ∧ (β ∨ γ)⇔ (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) (3.17)
can be deduced from the axioms of the language PL(S).
This failure of distributivity bars any na¨ıve realist interpretation of quantum logic.
If an instrumentalist interpretation is used instead, the spectral projectors Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]
now represent propositions about what would happen if a measurement is made, not
propositions about what is ‘actually the case’. And, of course, when a state is specified,
this does not yield actual truth values but only the Born-rule probabilities of getting
certain results.
4 A Higher-Order, Typed Language for Physics
4.1 The Basics of the Language L(S)
We want now to consider the possibility of representing the physical quantities of a
system by arrows in a topos other than Sets.
The physical meaning of such a quantity is not clear, a priori. Nor is it clear what
it is that is being represented in this way. However, what is clear is that in such a
situation it is no longer correct to work with a fixed value-space IR. Rather, the target-
object, RS , is potentially topos-dependent, and therefore part of the ‘representation’.
A powerful technique for allowing the quantity-value object to be system-dependent
is to add a symbol ‘R’ to the language. Developing this line of thinking suggests that
‘Σ’, too, should be added, as should a symbol ‘A : Σ → R’, to be construed as ‘what
it is’ that is represented by the arrow in a topos. Similarly, there should be a symbol
‘Ω’, to act as the linguistic precursor to the sub-object classifier in the topos; in the
topos Sets, this is just the set {0, 1}.
The clean way of doing all this is to construct, what Bell [9] calls, a ‘local lan-
guage’. Our basic assumption is that a unique local language, L(S), is associated with
each system S. Physical theories of S then correspond to representations of L(S) in
appropriate topoi.
The symbols of L(S). We first consider the minimal set of symbols needed to handle
elementary physics. For more sophisticated theories in physics, it will be necessary to
change, or enlarge, the set of ‘ground type’ symbols.
The symbols for the local language, L(S), are defined recursively as follows:
1. (a) The basic type symbols are 1,Ω,Σ,R. The last two, Σ and R, are known as
ground-type symbols. They are the linguistic precursors of the state object,
and quantity-value object, respectively.
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If T1, T2, . . . , Tn, n ≥ 1, are type symbols, then so is
20 T1 × T2 × · · · × Tn.
(b) If T is a type symbol, then so is PT .
2. (a) For each type symbol, T , there is associated a countable set of variables of
type T .
(b) There is a special symbol ∗.
3. (a) To each pair (T1, T2) of type symbols there is associated a set, FL(S)(T1, T2),
of function symbols. Such a symbol, A, is said to have signature T1 → T2;
this is indicated by writing A : T1 → T2.
(b) Some of these sets of function symbols may be empty. However, partic-
ular importance is attached to the set, FL(S)(Σ,R), of function symbols
A : Σ→ R, and we assume this set is non-empty.
The function symbols A : Σ→R represent the ‘physical quantities’ of the system,
and hence FL(S)(Σ,R) will depend on the system. In fact, the only parts of the language
that are system-dependent are these function symbols.
For example, if S1 is a point particle moving in one dimension, the set of physical
quantities could be chosen to be FL(S1)(Σ,R) = {x, p,H} which represent the position,
momentum, and energy of the system. On the other hand, if S2 is a particle moving in
three dimensions, we could have FL(S2)(Σ,R) = {x, y, z, px, py, pz, H} to allow for three-
dimensional position and momentum. Or, we could decide to add angular momentum
too, to give the set FL(S2)(Σ,R) = {x, y, z, px, py, pz, Jx, Jy, Jz, H}.
Note that, as with the propositional language PL(S), the fact that a given system
has a specific Hamiltonian21—expressed as a particular function of position and mo-
mentum coordinates—is not something that is to be coded into the language: instead,
such system dependence arises in the choice of representation of the language. This
means that many different systems can have the same local language.
Finally, it should be emphasised that this list of symbols is minimal and one may
want to add more. One obvious, general, example is a type symbol IN, to be inter-
preted as the linguistic analogue of the natural numbers. The language could then be
augmented with the axioms of Peano arithmetic.
The terms of L. The next step is to enumerate the ‘terms’ in the language, together
with their associated types [9, 10]:
1. (a) For each type symbol T , the variables of type T are terms of type T .
20By definition, if n = 0 then T1 × T2 × · · · × Tn := 1.
21It must be emphasised once more that the use of a local language is not restricted to standard,
canonical systems in which the concept of a ‘Hamiltonian’ is meaningful. The scope of the linguistic
ideas is much wider than that: the canonical systems are only an example. Indeed, our long-term
interest is in the application of these ideas to quantum gravity, where the local language is likely to
be very different from that used here. However, the basic ideas are the same.
18
(b) The symbol ∗ is a term of type 1.
(c) A term of type Ω is called a formula; a formula with no free variables is
called a sentence.
2. If A is function symbol with signature T1 → T2, and t is a term of type T1, then
A(t) is term of type T2.
In particular, if A : Σ→R is a physical quantity, and t is a term of type Σ, then
A(t) is a term of type R.
3. (a) If t1, t2, . . . , tn are terms of type T1, T2, . . . , Tn, then 〈t1, t2, . . . , tn〉 is a term
of type T1 × T2 × · · · × Tn.
(b) If t is a term of type T1× T2× · · ·× Tn, and if 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then (t)i is a term
of type Ti.
4. (a) If ω is a term of type Ω, and x˜ is a variable of type T , then {x˜ | ω} is a
term of type PT .
(b) If t1, t2 are terms of the same type, then t1 = t2 is a term of type Ω.
(c) If t1, t2 are terms of type T, PT respectively, then t1 ∈ t2 is a term of type
Ω.
Note that the logical operations are not included in the set of symbols. Instead,
they can all be defined using what is already given. For example, (i) true := (∗ = ∗);
and (ii) if α and β are terms of type Ω, then22 α ∧ β :=
(
〈α, β〉 = 〈true, true〉
)
. Thus,
in terms of the original set of symbols, we have
α ∧ β :=
(
〈α, β〉 = 〈∗ = ∗, ∗ = ∗〉
)
(4.1)
and so on.
Terms of particular interest to us. Let A be a physical quantity in the set
FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
, and therefore a function symbol of signature Σ → R. In addition, let
∆˜ be a variable (and therefore a term) of type PR; and let s˜ be a variable (and
therefore a term) of type Σ. Then some terms of particular interest to us are the
following:
1. A(s˜) is a term of type R with a free variable, s˜, of type Σ.
2. ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ is a term of type Ω with free variables (i) s˜ of type Σ; and (ii) ∆˜ of
type PR.
3. {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} is a term of type PΣ with a free variable ∆˜ of type PR.
22The parentheses ( ) are not symbols in the language, they are just a way of grouping letters and
sentences.
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As we shall see, {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} and ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ are (closely related) analogues of the
primitive propositions “Aε∆” in the propositional language PL(S). However, there
is a crucial difference. In PL(S), the ‘∆’ in “Aε∆” is a specific subset of the external
(to the language) real line IR. On the other hand, in the local language L(S), the ‘∆˜’
in ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ is an internal variable within the language.
Adding axioms to the language. To make the language L(S) into a deductive
system we need to add a set of appropriate axioms and rules of inference. The former
are expressed using sequents : defined as expressions of the form Γ : α where α is a
formula (a term of type Ω) and Γ is a set of such formula. The intention is that ‘Γ : α’
is to be read intuitively as “the collection of formula in Γ ‘imply’ α”. If Γ is empty we
just write : α.
The basic axioms include things like ‘α : α’ (tautology), and ‘: t˜ ∈ {t˜ | α} ⇔ α’
(comprehension) where t˜ is a variable of type T . These axioms23 and the rules of
inference (sophisticated analogues of modus ponens) give rise to a deductive system
using intuitionistic logic. For the details see [9, 10].
However, for applications in physics we could add extra axioms (in the form of
sequents). For example, perhaps the quantity-value object should always be an abelian-
group object24? This can be coded into the language by adding the axioms for an
abelian group structure for R. This involves the following steps:
1. Add the following symbols:
(a) A ‘unit’ function symbol 0 : 1 → R; this will be the linguistic analogue of
the unit element in an abelian group.
(b) An ‘addition’ function symbol + : R×R → R.
(c) An ‘inverse’ function symbol − : R→ R
23The complete set is [9]:
Tautology: α = α
Unity : x˜1 = ∗ where x˜1 is a variable of type 1.
Equality: x = y, α(z˜/x) : α(z˜/y). Here, α(z˜/x) is the term α with z˜ replaced by the
term x for each free occurrence of the variable z˜. The terms x and y must
be of the same type as z˜.
Products: : (〈x1, . . . , xn〉)i = xi
: x = 〈(x)1, . . . , (x)n〉
Comprehension: : t˜ ∈ {t˜ | α} ⇔ α
24One could go even further and add the axioms for real numbers. In this case, in a representation
of the language in a topos τ , the symbol R is mapped to the real-number object in the topos (if there
is one). However, the example of quantum theory suggests that this is inappropriate [2].
20
2. Then add axioms like ‘: ∀r˜
(
+ 〈r˜, 0(∗)〉 = r˜
)
’ where r˜ is a variable of type R, and
so on.
For another example, consider a point particle moving in three dimensions, with
the function symbols FL(S)(Σ,R) = {x, y, z, px, py, pz, Jx, Jy, Jz, H}. As L(S) stands,
there is no way to specify, for example, that ‘Jx = ypz − zpy’. Such relations can only
be implemented in a representation of the language. However, if this relation is felt to
be ‘universal’ (i.e., it holds in all physically-relevant representations) then it could be
added to the language with the use of extra axioms.
One of the delicate decisions that has to be made about L(S) is what extra axioms
to add to the base language. Too few, and the language lacks content; too many, and
representations of potential physical significance are excluded. This is one of the places
in the formalism where a degree of physical insight is necessary!
4.2 Representing L(S) in a Topos
The construction of a theory of the system S involves choosing a representation25/model,
φ, of the language L(S) in a topos26 τφ. The choice of both topos and representation
depend on the theory-type being used.
For example, consider a system, S, that can be treated using both classical physics
and quantum physics, such as a point particle moving in three dimensions. Then, for
the application of the theory-type ‘classical physics’, in a representation denoted σ, the
topos τσ is Sets, and Σ is represented by the symplectic manifold Σσ := T
∗IR3.
On the other hand, for the application of the theory-type ‘quantum physics’, τφ is
the topos, SetsV(H)
op
, of presheaves over the category27 V(H), where H ≃ L2(IR3, d3x)
is the Hilbert space of the system S. In this case, Σ is represented by Σφ := Σ, where
Σ is the spectral presheaf; this representation is discussed at length in papers II and III
[1, 2]. For both theory types, the details of, for example, the Hamiltonian, are coded
in the representation.
We now list the τφ-representation of the most significant symbols and terms in our
language, L(S) (we have only picked out the parts that are immediately relevant to
our programme: for full details see [9, 10]).
1. (a) The ground type symbols Σ and R are represented by objects Σφ and Rφ
in τφ. These are identified physically as the state object, and quantity-value
25The word ‘interpretation’ is often used in the mathematical literature, but we want to reserve
that for use in discussions of interpretations of quantum theory, and the like.
26A more comprehensive notation is τφ(S), which draws attention to the system S under discussion;
similarly, the state object could be written as Σφ,S , and so on. This extended notation is used in
paper IV where we are concerned with the relations between different systems, and then it is essential
to indicate which system is meant. However, in the present paper, only one system at a time is being
considered, and so the truncated notation is fine.
27We recall that the objects in V(H) are the unital, commutative von Neumann subalgebras of the
algebra, B(H), of all bounded operators on H.
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object, respectively.
(b) The symbol Ω, is represented by Ωφ := Ωτφ , the sub-object classifier of the
topos τφ.
(c) The symbol 1, is represented by 1φ := 1τφ, the terminal object in τφ.
2. For each type symbol PT , we have (PT )φ := PTφ, the power object of the object
Tφ in τφ.
In particular, (PΣ)φ = PΣφ and (PR)φ = PRφ.
3. Each function symbol A : Σ→R in FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
(i.e., each physical quantity) is
represented by an arrow Aφ : Σφ →Rφ in τφ.
We will generally require the representation to be faithful : i.e., the map A 7→ Aφ
is one-to-one.
4. A term of type Ω of the form ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ (which has free variables s˜, ∆˜ of type Σ
and PR respectively) is represented by an arrow [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ : Σφ×PRφ → Ωτφ .
In detail, this arrow is
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ = eRφ ◦ 〈[[A(s˜) ]]φ, [[ ∆˜ ]]φ〉 (4.2)
where eRφ : Rφ × PRφ → Ωτφ is the usual evaluation map; [[A(s˜) ]]φ : Σφ → Rφ
is the arrow Aφ; and [[ ∆˜ ]]φ : PRφ → PRφ is the identity.
Thus [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ is the chain of arrows:
Σφ × PRφ
Aφ×id
−→Rφ × PRφ
eRφ
−→Ωτφ . (4.3)
We see that the analogue of the ‘∆’ used in the PL(S)-propositions “Aε∆” is
played by sub-objects of Rφ (i.e., global elements of PRφ) in the domain of the
arrow in (4.3). These objects are, of course, representation-dependent (i.e., they
depend on φ).
5. A term of type PΣ of the form {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} (which has a free variable ∆˜ of
type PR) is represented by an arrow [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ : PRφ → PΣφ. This
arrow is the power transpose28 of [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ:
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ = p[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φq (4.4)
6. A term, ω, of type Ω with no free variables is represented by a global element
[[ω ]]φ : 1τφ → Ωτφ . These will typically act as ‘truth values’ for propositions
about the system.
7. Any axioms that have been added to the language are required to be represented
by the arrow true : 1τφ → Ωτφ .
28One of the basic properties of a topos is that there is a one-to-one correspondence between arrows
f : A×B → Ω and arrows pfq : A→ PB := ΩB. In general, pfq is called the power transpose of f .
If A ≃ 1 then pfq is known as the name of the arrow f : B → Ω. See (A.1) in the Appendix.
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The local set theory of a topos. We should emphasise that the decision to focus
on the particular type of language that we have, is not an arbitrary one. Indeed, there
is a deep connection between such languages and topos theory.
In this context, we first note that to any local language, L, there is associated a
‘local set theory’. This involves defining an ‘L-set’ to be a term X of power type
(so that expressions of the form x ∈ X are meaningful) and with no free variables.
Analogues of all the usual set operations can be defined on L-sets. For example, if
X, Y are L-sets of type PT , one can define X ∩ Y := {x˜ | x˜ ∈ X ∧ x˜ ∈ Y } where x˜ is
a variable of type T .
Furthermore, each local set theory, L, gives rise to an associated topos, C(L),
whose objects are equivalence classes of L-sets, where X ≡ Y is defined to mean that
the equation X = Y (i.e., a term of type Ω with no free variables) can be proved
using the sequent calculus of the language with its axioms. From this perspective, a
representation of L(S) in a topos τ is equivalent to a functor from the topos C(L(S))
to τ .
Conversely, for each topos τ there is a local language, L(τ), whose ground-type
symbols are the objects of τ , and whose function symbols are the arrows in τ . It then
follows that a representation of a local language, L, in τ is equivalent to a ‘translation’
of L in L(τ).
Thus, a rather elegant way of summarising what is involved in constructing a theory
of physics is that we are translating the language, L(S), of the system in another local
language, L(τ). As we will see in paper IV, the idea of translating one local language
into another plays a central role in the discussion of composite systems and sub-systems
[3].
4.3 Classical Physics in the Local Language L(S)
The quantum theory representation of L(S) is studied in papers II and III [1, 2] of the
present series. Here we will look at the concrete form of the expressions in the previous
Section for the example of classical physics. In this case, for all systems S, and all
classical representations, σ, the topos τσ is Sets. This representation of L(S) has the
following ingredients:
1. (a) The ground-type symbol Σ is represented by a symplectic manifold, Σσ, that
is the state-space for the system S.
(b) The ground-type symbol R is represented by the real line, i.e., Rσ := IR.
(c) The type symbol PΣ is represented by the set, PΣσ, of all subsets of the
state space Σσ.
The type symbol PR is represented by the set, P IR, of all subsets of IR.
2. (a) The type symbol Ω, is represented by ΩSets := {0, 1}: the sub-object classi-
fier in Sets.
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(b) The type symbol 1, is represented by the singleton set, i.e., 1Sets = {∗}: the
terminal object in Sets.
3. Each function symbol A : Σ → R, and hence each physical quantity, is repre-
sented by a real-valued function, Aσ : Σσ → IR, on the state space Σσ.
4. The term ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ of type Ω (where s˜ and ∆˜ are free variables of type Σ and
PR respectively) is represented by the function [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]σ : Σσ×P IR→ {0, 1}
that is defined by (c.f. (4.3))
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]σ(s,∆) =
{
1 if Aσ(s) ∈ ∆;
0 otherwise.
(4.5)
for all (s,∆) ∈ Σσ × P IR.
5. The term {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} of type PΣ (where ∆˜ is a free variable of type PR) is
represented by the function [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]σ : P IR→ PΣσ that is defined by
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]σ(∆) := {s ∈ Σφ | Aσ(s) ∈ ∆}
= A−1σ (∆) (4.6)
for all ∆ ∈ P IR.
4.4 Adapting the Language L(S) to Other Types of Physical
System
Our central contention in this series of papers is that (i) each physical system, S, can
be equipped with a local language, L(S); and (ii) constructing an explicit theory of S
in a particular theory-type is equivalent to finding a representation of L(S) in a topos
which may well be other than the topos of sets.
There are many situations in which the language is independent of the theory-type,
and then, for a given system S, the different topos representations of L(S), correspond
to the application of the different theory-types to the same system S. We gave an
example earlier of a point particle moving in three dimensions: the classical physics
representation is in the topos Sets; and, as shown in papers II and III, the quantum
theory representation is in the presheaf topos SetsV(L
2(IR3, d3x)) .
However, there are other situations where the relationship between the language
and its representations is more complicated than this. In particular, there is the critical
question about what features of the theory should go into the language, and what into
the representation. Adding new features would begin by adding to, or changing, the
set of ground-type symbols which generally represent the entities that are going to
be of generic interest (such as a state object or quantity-value object). In doing this,
extra axioms may also be introduced to encode the properties that the new objects are
expected to possess in all the representations that are of physical interest.
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For example, suppose we want to use our formalism to discuss space-time physics:
where does the information about the space-time go? If the subject is classical field
theory in a curved space-time, then the topos τ is Sets, and the space-time manifold is
part of the background structure. This makes it natural to have the manifold assumed
in the representation; i.e., the information about the space-time is in the representation.
However, alternatively one can add a new ground type symbol, ‘M ’, to the language,
to serve as the linguistic progenitor of ‘space-time’; thus M would have the same
theoretical status as the symbols Σ and R. A function symbol ψ :M →R is then the
progenitor of a physical field. In a representation φ, the object Mφ plays the role of
‘space-time’ in the topos τφ, and ψφ : Mφ → Rφ is the representation of a field in this
theory.
Of course, the language L(S) says nothing about what sort of entity Mφ is, except
in so far as such information is encoded in extra axioms. For example, if the subject
is classical field theory, then τφ = Sets, and Mφ would be a standard differentiable
manifold. On the other hand, if the topos τφ admits ‘infinitesimals’, then Mφ could be
a manifold according to the language of synthetic differential geometry [13].
A fortiori, the same type of argument applies to the status of ‘time’ in a canonical
theory. In particular, it is possible to add a ground type symbol, T , so that, in any
representation, φ, the object Tφ in the topos τφ is the analogue of the ‘time-line’ for
that theory. For standard physics in Sets we have Tφ = IR, but the form of Tφ in a
more general topos, τφ, would be a rich subject for speculation.
The addition of a ‘time-type’ symbol, T , to the language L(S) is a prime example
of a situation where one might want to add extra axioms. These could involve ordering
properties, or algebraic properties like those of an abelian group, and so on. These
properties would be realised in any representation as the corresponding type of object
in the topos τφ. Thus abelian group axioms mean that Tφ is an abelian-group object in
τφ; total-ordering axioms for the time-type T mean that Tφ is a totally-ordered object
in τφ, and so on.
As a rather interesting extension of this idea, one could have a space-time ground
type symbolM , but then add the axioms for a partial ordering. In that case,Mφ would
be a poset-object in τφ, which could be interpreted physically as the τφ-analogue of a
causal set [32].
Yet another possibility is to develop a language for history theories, and use it study
the topos version of the consistent-histories approach to quantum theory.
We will return to some of these ideas in future publications.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the first in a series, we have introduced the idea that a formal language
can be attached to each physical system, and that constructing a theory of that sys-
tem is equivalent to finding a representation of this language in an appropriate topos.
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The long-term goal of this research programme is to provide a novel framework for
constructing theories of physics in general; in particular, to construct theories that go
‘beyond’ standard quantum theory, and especially in the direction of quantum cosmol-
ogy. In doing so, we have constructed a formalism that is not tied to the familiar use
of Hilbert spaces, or formal path integrals, and which, therefore, need not assume a
priori the use of continuum quantities in physics.
We have introduced two different types of language that can apply to a given system
S. The first is the propositional language, PL(S), that deals only with propositions of
the form “Aε∆”. The intention is represent these propositions in a Heyting algebra
of sub-objects of some object in a topos that is identified as the analogue of a ‘state
space’. The simplest example is classical physics, where propositions are represented
by the Boolean algebra of (Borel) subsets of the classical state space. The example of
quantum theory is considerably more interesting and is discussed in detail in paper II
[1].
The second type of language that we discussed is considerably more powerful. This
is the ‘local’ language L(S) which includes symbols for the state object and quantity-
value object (and/or whatever theoretical entities are felt to be of representation-
independent importance), as well as symbols for the physical quantities in the system.
The key idea is that constructing a theory of S is equivalent is to finding a represen-
tation of this entire language (not just the propositional part) in a topos. As with
PL(S), the language L(S) forms a deductive system that is based on intuitionistic
logic: something that is naturally adapted to finding a representation in a topos.
Any theory of this type is necessarily ‘neo-realist’ in the sense that physical quan-
tities are represented by arrows Aφ : Σφ → Rφ; and propositions are represented by
sub-objects of Σφ, the set of which is a Heyting algebra. In this sense, these topos-
based theories all ‘look’ like classical physics, except of course that, generally speaking,
the topos concerned is not Sets.
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A A Brief Account of the Relevant Parts of Topos
Theory
A.1 Presheaves on a Poset
Topos theory is a remarkably rich branch of mathematics which can be approached
from a variety of different viewpoints. The basic area of mathematics is category
theory; where, we recall, a category consists of a collection of objects and a collection
of morphisms (or arrows).
In the special case of the category of sets, the objects are sets, and a morphism
is a function between a pair of sets. In general, each morphism f in a category is
associated with a pair of objects, known as its ‘domain’ and ‘codomain’, and is written
as f : B → A where B and A are the domain and codomain respectively. Note that
this arrow notation is used even if f is not a function in the normal set-theoretic sense.
A key ingredient in the definition of a category is that if f : B → A and g : C → B
(i.e., the codomain of g is equal to the domain of f) then f and g can be ‘composed’
to give an arrow f ◦ g : C → A; in the case of the category of sets, this is just the usual
composition of functions.
A simple example of a category is given by any partially-ordered set (‘poset’) C:
(i) the objects are defined to be the elements of C; and (ii) if p, q ∈ C, a morphism
from p to q is defined to exist if, and only if, p  q in the poset structure. Thus, in
a poset regarded as a category, there is at most one morphism between any pair of
objects p, q ∈ C; if it exists, we shall write this morphism as ipq : p→ q. This example
is important for us in form of the ‘category of contexts’, V(H), in quantum theory
(see papers II-IV). The objects in V(H) are the commutative, unital von Neumann
subalgebras of the algebra, B(H), of all bounded operators on the Hilbert space H.
(Unital means that all these algebras contain the identity operator 1ˆ ∈ B(H).)
The definition of a topos. From our perspective, the most relevant feature of a
topos, τ , is that it is a category which behaves in many ways like the category of sets
[8, 11]. Most of the precise details are not necessary for the present series of papers,
but here we will list some of the most important ones for our purposes:
1. There is a terminal object 1τ in τ ; this means that given any object A in the
topos, there is a unique arrow A→ 1τ .
For any object A in the topos, an arrow 1τ → A is called a global element
29 of
A. The set of all global elements of A is denoted ΓA.
Given A,B ∈ Ob(τ), there is a product A× B in τ . In fact, a topos always has
pull-backs, and the product is just a special case of this.30
29In the category of sets, Sets, the terminal object 1Sets is a singleton set {∗}. It follows that the
elements of ΓA are in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of A.
30The conditions in 1. above are equivalent to saying that τ is finitely complete.
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2. There is an initial object 0τ in τ . This means that given any object A in the
topos, there is a unique arrow 0τ → A.
Given A,B ∈ Ob(τ), there is a co-product A ⊔ B in τ . In fact, a topos always
has push-outs, and the co-product is just a special case of this.31
3. There is exponentiation: i.e., given objects A,B in τ we can form the object AB,
which is the topos analogue of the set of functions from B to A in set theory.
The definitive property of exponentiation is that, given any object C, there is an
isomorphism
Homτ
(
C,AB
)
≃ Homτ
(
C ×B,A
)
(A.1)
that is natural in A and C.
4. There is a sub-object classifier Ωτ .
The last item is of particular importance to us as it is the source of the Heyting
algebras that we use so much. To explain what is meant, let us first consider the
familiar topos, Sets, of sets. There, the subsets K ⊆ X of a set X are in one-to-one
correspondence with functions χK : X → {0, 1}, where χK(x) = 1 if x ∈ K, and
χK(x) = 0 otherwise. Thus the target space {0, 1} can be regarded as the simplest
‘false-true’ Boolean algebra, and the mathematical proposition “x ∈ K” is true if
χK(x) = 1, and false otherwise.
In the case of a topos, τ , the sub-objects32 K of an object X in the topos are in
one-to-one correspondence with arrows χK : X → Ωτ , where the special object Ωτ—
called the ‘sub-object classifier’, or ‘object of truth values’—plays an analogous role to
that of {0, 1} in the category of sets.
An important property for us is that, in any topos τ , the collection, Sub(A), of sub-
objects of an object A forms a Heyting algebra. The reader is referred to the standard
texts for proofs (for example, see [8], p151).
The idea of a presheaf. To illustrate the main ideas, we will first give a few def-
initions from the theory of presheaves on a partially ordered set (or ‘poset’); in the
case of quantum theory, this poset is the space of ‘contexts’ in which propositions are
asserted. We shall then use these ideas to motivate the definition of a presheaf on
a general category. Only the briefest of treatments is given here, and the reader is
referred to the standard literature for more information [8, 11].
A presheaf (also known as a varying set) X on a poset C is a function that assigns to
each p ∈ C, a set Xp; and to each pair p  q (i.e., ipq : p→ q), a map Xqp : Xq → Xp
such that (i) Xpp : Xp → Xp is the identity map idXp on Xp, and (ii) whenever
p  q  r, the composite map Xr
Xrq
−→ Xq
Xqp
−→ Xp is equal to Xr
Xrp
−→ Xp, so that
Xrp = Xqp ◦Xrq. (A.2)
31The conditions in 2. above are equivalent to saying that τ is finitely co-complete.
32An object K is a sub-object of another object X if there is a monic arrow K →֒ X . In the topos
Sets of sets, this is equivalent to saying that K is a subset of X .
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The notation Xqp is shorthand for the more cumbersome X(ipq); see below in the
definition of a functor.
An arrow, or natural transformation η : X → Y between two presheaves X, Y on
C is a family of maps ηp : Xp → Y p, p ∈ C, that satisfy the intertwining conditions
ηp ◦Xqp = Y qp ◦ ηq (A.3)
whenever p  q. This is equivalent to the commutative diagram
Y q Y p-Y qp
Xq Xp-
Xqp
?
ηq
?
ηp
(A.4)
A sub-object of a presheaf X is a presheaf K, with an arrow i : K → X such that (i)
Kp ⊆ Xp for all p ∈ C; and (ii) for all p  q, the map Kqp : Kq → Kp is the restriction
of Xqp : Xq → Xp to the subset Kq ⊆ Xq. This is shown in the commutative diagram
Xq Xp-Xqp
Kq Kp-
Kqp
? ?
(A.5)
where the vertical arrows are subset inclusions.
The collection of all presheaves on a poset C forms a category, denoted SetsC
op
.
The arrows/morphisms between presheaves in this category are defined as the arrows
above.
A.2 Presheaves on a General Category
The ideas sketched above admit an immediate generalization to the theory of presheaves
on an arbitrary ‘small’ category C (the qualification ‘small’ means that the collection
of objects is a genuine set, as is the collection of all arrows/morphisms between any
pair of objects). To make the necessary definition we first need the idea of a ‘functor’:
1. The idea of a functor: A central concept is that of a ‘functor’ between a pair of
categories C and D. Broadly speaking, this is an arrow-preserving function from one
category to the other. The precise definition is as follows.
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Definition A.1 1. A covariant functor F from a category C to a category D is a
function that assigns
(a) to each C-object A, a D-object FA;
(b) to each C-morphism f : B → A, a D-morphism F(f) : FB → FA such that
F(idA) = idFA; and, if g : C → B, and f : B → A then
F(f ◦ g) = F(f) ◦ F(g). (A.6)
2. A contravariant functor X from a category C to a category D is a function that
assigns
(a) to each C-object A, a D-object XA;
(b) to each C-morphism f : B → A, a D-morphism X(f) : XA → XB such that
X(idA) = idXA; and, if g : C → B, and f : B → A then
X(f ◦ g) = X(g) ◦X(f). (A.7)
The connection with the idea of a presheaf on a poset is straightforward. As men-
tioned above, a poset C can be regarded as a category in its own right, and it is clear
that a presheaf on the poset C is the same thing as a contravariant functor X from
the category C to the category Sets of normal sets. Equivalently, it is a covariant
functor from the ‘opposite’ category33 Cop to Sets. Clearly, (A.2) corresponds to the
contravariant condition (A.7). Note that mathematicians usually call the objects in C
‘stages of truth’, or just ‘stages’. For us they are ‘contexts’.
2. Presheaves on an arbitrary category C: These remarks motivate the definition
of a presheaf on an arbitrary small category C: namely, a presheaf on C is a covariant
functor34 X : Cop → Sets from Cop to the category of sets. Equivalently, a presheaf is
a contravariant functor from C to the category of sets.
We want to make the collection of presheaves on C into a category, and therefore we
need to define what is meant by a ‘morphism’ between two presheaves X and Y . The
intuitive idea is that such a morphism from X to Y must give a ‘picture’ of X within
Y . Formally, such a morphism is defined to be a natural transformation N : X → Y ,
by which is meant a family of maps (called the components of N) NA : XA → Y A,
A ∈ Ob(C), such that if f : B → A is a morphism in C, then the composite map
XA
NA−→ Y A
Y (f)
−→ Y B is equal to XA
X(f)
−→ XB
NB−→ Y A. In other words, we have the
33The ‘opposite’ of a category C is a category, denoted Cop, whose objects are the same as those of
C, and whose morphisms are defined to be the opposite of those of C; i.e., a morphism f : A→ B in
Cop is said to exist if, and only if, there is a morphism f : B → A in C.
34Throughout this series of papers, a presheaf is indicated by a letter that is underlined.
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commutative diagram
Y A Y B-Y (f)
XA XB-
X(f)
?
NA
?
NB
(A.8)
of which (A.4) is clearly a special case. The category of presheaves on C equipped with
these morphisms is denoted SetsC
op
.
The idea of a sub-object generalizes in an obvious way. Thus we say that K is a
sub-object of X if there is a morphism in the category of presheaves (i.e., a natural
transformation) ι : K → X with the property that, for each A, the component map
ιA : KA → XA is a subset embedding, i.e., KA ⊆ XA. Thus, if f : B → A is any
morphism in C, we get the analogue of the commutative diagram (A.5):
XA XB-X(f)
KA KB-
K(f)
? ?
(A.9)
where, once again, the vertical arrows are subset inclusions.
The category of presheaves on C, SetsC
op
, forms a topos. We do not need the full
definition of a topos; but we do need the idea, mentioned in Section A.1, that a topos
has a sub-object classifier Ω, to which we now turn.
3. Sieves and the sub-object classifier Ω. Among the key concepts in presheaf
theory is that of a ‘sieve’, which plays a central role in the construction of the sub-object
classifier in the topos of presheaves on a category C.
A sieve on an object A in C is defined to be a collection S of morphisms f : B → A
in C with the property that if f : B → A belongs to S, and if g : C → B is any
morphism with co-domain B, then f ◦ g : C → A also belongs to S. In the simple case
where C is a poset, a sieve on p ∈ C is any subset S of C such that if r ∈ S then (i)
r  p, and (ii) r′ ∈ S for all r′  r; in other words, a sieve is nothing but a lower set
in the poset.
The presheaf Ω : C → Sets is now defined as follows. If A is an object in C, then
ΩA is defined to be the set of all sieves on A; and if f : B → A, then Ω(f) : ΩA → ΩB
is defined as
Ω(f)(S) := {h : C → B | f ◦ h ∈ S} (A.10)
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for all S ∈ ΩA; the sieve Ω(f)(S) is often written as f
∗(S), and is known as the pull-back
to B of the sieve S on A by the morphism f : B → A.
It should be noted that if S is a sieve on A, and if f : B → A belongs to S, then
from the defining property of a sieve we have
f ∗(S) := {h : C → B | f ◦ h ∈ S} = {h : C → B} =: ↓B (A.11)
where ↓B denotes the principal sieve on B, defined to be the set of all morphisms in C
whose codomain is B. In words: the pull-back of any sieve on A by a morphism from
B to A that belongs to the sieve, is the principal sieve on B.
If C is a poset, the pull-back operation corresponds to a family of maps Ωqp : Ωq →
Ωp (where Ωp denotes the set of all sieves/lower sets on p in the poset) defined by
Ωqp = Ω(ipq) if ipq : p → q (i.e., p  q). It is straightforward to check that if S ∈ Ωq,
then
Ωqp(S) :=↓p ∩ S (A.12)
where ↓p := {r ∈ C | r  p}.
A crucial property of sieves is that the set ΩA of sieves on A has the structure of
a Heyting algebra. Specifically, ΩA is a Heyting algebra where the unit element 1ΩA
in ΩA is the principal sieve ↓A, and the null element 0ΩA is the empty sieve ∅. The
partial ordering in ΩA is defined by S1  S2 if, and only if, S1 ⊆ S2; and the logical
connectives are defined as:
S1 ∧ S2 := S1 ∩ S2 (A.13)
S1 ∨ S2 := S1 ∪ S2 (A.14)
S1 ⇒ S2 := {f : B → A | ∀ g : C → B if f ◦ g ∈ S1 then f ◦ g ∈ S2}(A.15)
As in any Heyting algebra, the negation of an element S (called the pseudo-complement
of S) is defined as ¬S := S ⇒ 0; so that
¬S := {f : B → A | for all g : C → B, f ◦ g 6∈ S}. (A.16)
It can be shown that the presheaf Ω is a sub-object classifier for the topos SetsC
op
.
That is to say, sub-objects of any object X in this topos (i.e., any presheaf on C)
are in one-to-one correspondence with morphisms χ : X → Ω. This works as follows.
First, let K be a sub-object of X. Then there is an associated characteristic morphism
χK : X → Ω, whose ‘component’ χKA : XA → ΩA at each stage/context A in C is
defined as
χKA(x) := {f : B → A | X(f)(x) ∈ KB} (A.17)
for all x ∈ XA. That the right hand side of (A.17) actually is a sieve on A follows
from the defining properties of a sub-object.
Thus, in each ‘branch’ of the category C going ‘down’ from the stage A, χKA(x)
picks out the first member B in that branch for which X(f)(x) lies in the subset KB,
and the commutative diagram (A.9) then guarantees that X(h◦f)(x) will lie in KC for
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all h : C → B. Thus each stage A in C serves as a possible context for an assignment
to each x ∈ XA of a generalised truth value—a sieve belonging to the Heyting algebra
ΩA. This is the sense in which contextual, generalised truth values arise naturally in a
topos of presheaves.
There is a converse to (A.17): namely, each morphism χ : X → Ω (i.e., a natural
transformation between the presheaves X and Ω) defines a sub-object Kχ of X via
KχA := χ
−1
A {1ΩA}. (A.18)
at each stage A.
4. Global elements of a presheaf: We recall that, in any topos, τ , a terminal
object is defined to be an object 1τ with the property that, for any object X in the
category, there is a unique morphism X → 1τ ; it is easy to show that terminal objects
are unique up to isomorphism. A global element of an object X is then defined to be
any morphism s : 1τ → X. The motivation for this nomenclature is that, in the case of
the category of sets, a terminal object is any singleton set {∗}; and then it is true that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of a set X and functions
from {∗} to X.
For the category of presheaves on C, a terminal object 1 : C → Sets can be defined
by 1A := {∗} at all stages A in C; if f : B → A is a morphism in C then 1(f) : {∗} → {∗}
is defined to be the map ∗ 7→ ∗. This is indeed a terminal object since, for any presheaf
X, we can define a unique natural transformation N : X → 1 whose components
NA : X(A)→ 1A = {∗} are the constant maps x 7→ ∗ for all x ∈ XA.
A global element of a presheaf X is also called a global section. As a morphism
γ : 1→ X in the topos SetsC
op
, a global element corresponds to a choice of an element
γA ∈ XA for each stage A in C, such that, if f : B → A, the ‘matching condition’
X(f)(γA) = γB (A.19)
is satisfied.
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